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ABSTRACT 
DERRALD STICE: The Market Response to Implied Debt Covenant Violations 
(Under the direction of Jeffery Abarbanell) 
Previous research documents a negative stock price reaction to the announcement of 
debt covenant violations.  I find evidence that investors price the likelihood of an earnings-
based debt covenant violation on the date firms report earnings.  Furthermore, I find no 
evidence of a negative stock price reaction to the announcement of an actual debt covenant 
violation when there was high likelihood of such a violation implied by previous reported 
earnings. My results suggest that the cost of debt covenant violations in the cross-section is 
higher than estimated in the previous literature.  
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1. Introduction 
Prior research demonstrates there is a negative stock price reaction to the public 
revelation of debt covenant violations on quarterly (10-Q) and annual (10-K) filing dates (see 
e.g., Beneish and Press (1995)).  Over half of all financial debt covenants are based on some 
variant of accounting earnings.  Because most publicly-traded firms make a preliminary 
announcement of earnings weeks before the SEC filing date I investigate whether the market 
uses information in realized earnings to price the likelihood of a debt covenant violation 
(hereafter DCV) and the extent to which this reduces the stock price impact of an actual 
subsequent disclosure.  Controlling for the information content of earnings and losses, I find 
evidence of a significant incremental negative price reaction on earnings announcement dates 
when realized earnings, ceteris paribus, imply a high likelihood of an earnings-based debt 
covenant violation. The result holds even when there are no explicit disclosures related to DCVs 
on earnings announcement dates.  I also find no significant price response to the disclosure of an 
actual debt covenant violation on SEC filing dates for firms that previously reported earnings 
that implied a high likelihood of a debt covenant violation. These results complement and extend 
the findings of prior studies that report negative stock price reactions to the announcement of 
DCVs and suggest that the total costs of debt covenant violations in the cross-section are 
substantially higher than previously estimated.    
Beneish and Press (1993) estimate the average costs of DCVs attributable to increased 
interest rates and renegotiation fees are between one and two percent of the market value of 
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equity for their sample of firms that actually disclose a violation.  In a subsequent study, Beneish 
and Press (1995) investigate the stock price reaction to a DCV disclosure.  They find that 
announcements of technical default of debt covenants are associated with a significant -3.52% 
return in the 3-day period surrounding announcements of debt covenant violation, 60% of which 
occur on the SEC filing date of the 10-K or NT 10-K.  The fact that the majority of DCV 
violations are disclosed on SEC filing dates suggests that firms tend to wait until the latest 
possible date under SEC regulations to reveal the existence of an unresolved technical default 
(see, Griffin, Lont, and McClune 2010).
1
  
Because earnings are announced, on average, several weeks before financial statements 
are officially submitted to the SEC (see Alford, Jones and Zmijewski, 1994), it is possible that 
new information about possible earnings-based DCVs becomes available to investors well before 
the firm officially acknowledges them in an SEC filing.  Consistent with this possibility Nini, 
Smith and Sufi (2009) report that returns are significantly negative in the months leading up to 
and including the SEC filing date for firms that disclose DCVs.  I argue that if new information 
about the likelihood of DCV is revealed in announced earnings, then returns will be decreasing 
in a measure of that likelihood on the date of an earnings announcement.  Furthermore, to the 
extent that this measure is positively correlated with actual DCV, I expect that the negative price 
response to DCV disclosures typically observed on to the SEC filing date will be attenuated. 
To test these predictions I construct an earnings-announcement implied covenant 
violation measure using the reported earnings from the announcement, information available at 
                                                          
1 
SEC Regulation S-X states that “any breach of covenant which exists at the date of the most recent balance sheet 
filed and which has not been subsequently cured shall be stated in the notes to the financial statement (SEC 
(1988)).”  A more recent reiteration of this directive is reported in Sufi (2007): “… companies that are, or are 
reasonably likely to be, in breach of such covenants must disclose material information about that breach and 
analyze the impact on the company if material (SEC (2003)).” 
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the earnings announcement date, and debt covenant-specific information from Dealscan. Based 
on reported earnings, I calculate the debt-to-EBITDA ratio on the date of the announcement and 
then compare it to the stated covenant ratio at the date of the announcement.
2
  I validate the 
predictive ability of the measure on a large sample of firms, some of which report an actual 
DCV.  The measure has predictive ability at least two quarters in advance of an actual DCV.   
Next, I examine the 3-day return around earnings announcements for firms meeting data 
requirements for my sample.  After controlling for earnings surprises and a set of control 
variables employed in the prior literature, I find that announcement date returns are decreasing in 
the measure of implied covenant violation.  Furthermore, I find no evidence of a negative stock 
price response to a DCV on the SEC filing date among firms for which there is a disclosed debt 
covenant violation.  
In the next section I develop my hypotheses. I describe the sample selection procedures 
and variables used in this study in section 3.  Section 4 presents the empirical results. A summary 
and conclusion is provided in section 5.  
 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Debt Covenants and the Costliness of Covenant Violations 
Covenants are included in debt contracts to reduce lender risk by limiting managers’ 
ability to extract rents from debt holders and by giving lenders control of the firm during bad 
                                                          
2
 Typically this is the debt-to-EBITDA ratio from the previous quarterly earnings statement, adjusted to incorporate 
current period earnings, because the ratio contains several components that may not be available to the market at the 
earnings announcement date. I discuss the assumptions underlying the estimation of these components measures and 
possible biases in the next section. 
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economic states of the firm.
3
  Debt holders only suffer from economic losses, and are relatively 
unaffected by economic gains, so they are concerned about gaining control of the firm as quickly 
as possible when their investment is at risk (see e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1992).  Covenant 
inclusion is costly to the firm, but the commitment to turning over firm control to the lender 
during bad states generates ex ante more favorable borrowing terms for the borrowing firm (see 
e.g., Bradley and Roberts, 2004). 
Inclusion of debt covenants grants more favorable terms to the borrowers, however, 
violation is itself costly to shareholders (see Smith 1993). Gilson (1990) documents that creditors 
become large shareholders during bankruptcy and Baird and Rasmussen (2006) argue that even 
before bankruptcy, lenders exert strong influence over firms after covenant violation. Recent 
research also provides evidence that covenant violations are associated with a shift of firm 
control to lenders (see, e.g., Roberts and Sufi 2009b for a survey of his literature). For example, 
Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) find that DCV are followed by increases in CEO turnover, increases 
in corporate restructurings, slowdowns  in mergers and acquisitions, decreases in capital 
expenditures, and reductions in debt use and dividend payouts.  Chava and Roberts (2008) also 
report that capital investment decreases after financial covenant violation.  Roberts and Sufi 
(2009a) show that covenant violations lead to restricted access to debt financing, and Sufi (2009) 
shows that debt covenant violations lead to decreases in the availability of lines of credit.  These 
studies provide evidence that firms that violate debt covenants incur costs related to the transfer 
of control to lenders even before payment default. 
                                                          
3
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) list unwarranted distributions to shareholders, issuance of higher priority debt claims, 
and investments in negative net present value projects for purposes of empire building and diversification as 
potential actions that debt covenants attempt to prevent. 
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Once a debt covenant is triggered, lenders can choose to accelerate the loan or renegotiate 
the contract.  Renegotiation can be costly - Beneish and Press (1993) estimate that the average 
costs of DCV attributable to increased interest rates and renegotiation fees are between one and 
two percent of the market value of equity for their sample of firms.  Roberts and Sufi (2009a) 
find that covenant violations are associated with increased interest rates.   
DCV may also result in the costly imposition of additional covenants during the 
negotiation process.  Core and Schrand (1999) use an option pricing framework to model firm 
value when firms face costs associated with DCV and test the implications of their model on a 
sample of thrift institutions. They find evidence that current information about a firm can affect 
current equity value even if that information is not correlated with future cash flows as long as 
that information changes the probability of violating a debt covenant in subsequent periods.  That 
is, an increase in the number of covenants can potentially create a larger “future news” 
information set that negatively affects firm value, even if that news provides no information 
about future cash flows.
4
 
Beneish and Press (1995) investigate the stock price reaction to a DCV disclosure. 
Motivated by prior studies demonstrating the costliness of violation, Beneish and Press predict 
that the announcement of a violation will generate a negative stock price reaction.  They employ 
a sample of 87 firms for which accounting-based DCV was publicly disclosed in financial 
                                                          
4 
The severity of the cost of DCV has also been inferred from evidence of the exercise of managerial reporting 
discretion.  Watts and Zimmerman (1978) posit that managers will choose accounting methods that will decrease the 
probability of debt covenant violation and several studies have found evidence consistent with this assertion.  
Sweeney (1994) finds that firms that are approaching a debt covenant violation respond with income-increasing 
accounting changes.  DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) examine a sample of firms that violated debt covenants and find 
that in the year before and in the year of the covenant violation, total accruals and working capital accruals are 
significantly positive.  Beatty and Weber (2003) find that firms with debt covenants are more likely to adopt income 
increasing accounting policies than are firms without debt covenants. 
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statements on the SEC filing date or in news media articles.  Beneish and Press find that 
announcements of technical default of debt covenants are associated with a significant negative 
3.52% return in the 3-day period surrounding disclosure of a debt covenant violation. In 
documenting the association between insider trading and DCV, Griffin, Lont, and McClune 
(2010) provide evidence of a similar negative reaction to the announcement of DCV.  
 
2.2. Debt Covenant Violation Prediction 
The goal of this study is to explore the ability of the market to estimate the cost of actual 
DCV or, alternatively, the costs incurred to avoid a DCV that may never be directly observed by 
the market.  This study focuses on firms with earnings-based debt covenants because the 
earnings announcement date provides investors the ability to immediately impound new 
information about the probability of a DCV without the actual disclosure of a violation.
5
  The use 
of an event study methodology increases that likelihood that earnings announcements are the 
source of that information. Whether the market has sufficient information to infer a change in the 
probability of a DCV is an empirical question. 
In order to test the market reaction to an implied DCV, it is necessary to construct a 
measure that captures a high likelihood of covenant violation in a timely manner.  A recent study 
by Murfin (2009) creates a measure of contract “strictness” that attempts to capture the ex ante 
probability of covenant violation.  Murfin incorporates four measures in creating “strictness”: the 
number of covenants, the tightness of each covenant, the scale of each covenant, and the 
                                                          
5 
Griffin, Lont, and McClune (2010) provide evidence that some informed market participants, firm insiders, begin 
to sell their personal holdings at least one month prior to covenant violation disclosure. However, given that they 
also document a negative price reaction to a DCV for their sample, it would appear that the report of changes in 
insider holdings is not sufficient to inform investors about the likelihood of a DCV in a timely manner. 
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covariance of covenant ratios.  An advantage of his approach is that it can be applied to a broad 
sample of firms. The main disadvantage of his approach for my purposes is that much of the 
information that goes into his measures is stale or unavailable at the earnings announcement 
date.
6
  Dyreng (2009) also develops a model of covenant violation, drawing from the bankruptcy 
prediction literature beginning with Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), but his model assumes 
that covenant slack is a linear combination of accounting and market variables and the focus of 
my tests is on market reactions to new information.  I include the non-market related variables 
used in Dyreng (2009) as controls in my tests. 
Because I am interested in examining the ability of the market to infer earnings-based 
DCV, I require each contract in my sample to include an earnings-based covenant.  After 
investigating the prevalence of various covenants in debt contracts and the availability of 
different covenant components at the earnings announcement date (see sample selection section 
for details) I chose to focus on debt-to-EBITDA covenant.  I construct my measure by taking the 
contracted covenant ratio from Dealscan, information contemporaneously available, and the 
earnings reported at the earnings announcement date to derive an implied measure of covenant 
slack.  I discuss the construction of the measure in more detail in the next section. 
The approach I follow generates noise from at least two sources.  First, the language used 
to specify a debt covenant varies by contract.  Identically named covenants need not be 
identically calculated.  Second, even knowing the calculation used for a specific covenant in a 
specific contract may not guarantee exact measurement.  Variation can occur from reliance on 
                                                          
6 
Two of the components of the measure used by Murfin; the number of covenants and the covenant scale, do not 
change between earnings announcement dates.  The remaining components; covenant slack and covenant ratio 
covariance, are updated quarterly using Compustat data. Thus, most of the information necessary to compute these 
components is not available on the earnings announcement date.   
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non-GAAP accounting data certified by the CFO that is not publicly available (see, e.g., 
Leftwich 1983, Murfin 2009 and Chava and Roberts 2009).  Given these concerns I define the 
most extreme group of negative and low slack estimates by year as the firms most likely to have 
violated a covenant.   
 
2.3. Hypothesis Development 
My first hypothesis is motivated by the logic offered in Beneish and Press (1995) for a 
sample of firms for which disclosure of a DCV takes place, for the most part, on the SEC filing 
date. Unlike Beneish and Press (1995), who use a sample of accounting-based debt covenants, it 
is not necessary to wait for a formal announcement from the firm or a news media article to infer 
DCV for my sample of earnings-based covenant firms.
7
  If DCV is costly and there is new 
information pertinent to the increased likelihood of a DCV in reported earnings, then there 
should be a negative price reaction to the announcement of earnings for these firms on the 
earnings announcement date.   
 Dichev and Skinner (2002) document that covenant violation occurs fairly often - 30% of 
the loans in their sample - and that the most common lender response to DCV in their sample is 
to waive the violation.
8
  If implied violations, identified using my measure, are likely to be 
waived, then it is possible that investors will not view implied DCV as being costly. 
Furthermore, it is possible that an implied DCV may be associated with a positive stock price 
                                                          
7
 Beneish and Press conduct their tests using a sample of firms with accounting-based debt covenants.  Over 90% of 
the 130 DCV announcements examined by Beneish and Press (1995) involved violations of one or more of the 
following accounting-based covenants: tangible net worth, current ratio, or leverage. Only 9 of 130 violated 
covenants were earnings-based.  Evidence presented later suggests it would not have been possible to infer 
violations for most other accounting-based covenants examined by Beneish and Press on earnings announcement 
dates.  
8 Dichev and Skinner (2002) also find that renegotiation is very common.  Roberts and Sufi (2009c) use a large 
sample of private debt contracts and find that 90% of long-term debt contracts are renegotiated before maturity.   
9 
 
reaction if minority shareholders view increased control by lenders as improving the prospect of 
firms with entrenched, ineffective management. For example, Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) 
document an increase in CEO turnover and corporate restructuring and a decrease in capital 
expenditures and debt usage after covenant violations.  They find that while in the months 
leading up to DCV firms experience significantly negative operating cash flows and returns; 
these firms experience significantly positive operating cash flows and returns in the months after 
(see Griffin, Lont, and McClune (2010) who document a similar pattern of returns around DCV 
disclosure).  Stocks of firms in the month of a DCV earn 5% more than the risk-adjusted 
benchmark in the 12 months following violation.  If actual DCVs trigger changes in firm 
management and strategy that investors expect will lead to subsequent improved performance, 
then it is possible for the market to react positively to an implied DCV.   
The preceding considerations notwithstanding, I expect the market reaction observed for 
actual DCV in the previous literature to occur on the earnings announcement date in the case of 
an implied earnings-based covenant violation. Formally: 
 
H1:   There is negative stock price reaction to the announcement of earnings that imply a 
violation of an earnings-based debt covenant.   
 
Prior studies have focused on first-time covenant violations (Beneish and Press (1995), 
Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009).
9
 First-time actual covenant violations should produce market 
reactions that capture the market’s unbiased assessment of the full cost of a particular violation. 
In contrast, a sequence of implied DCVs could lead to a non-zero market reaction on each 
                                                          
9
 Beneish and Press (1995) restrict their sample to firms that disclose a violation only once during their five-year 
sample period.   
10 
 
earnings announcement date. On the one hand, a string of implied DCVs may convey additional 
negative news or an increased likelihood of an actual DCV. Chen and Wei (1993) model the 
lender decision to waive a covenant violation or call the debt.  They predict and find evidence 
consistent with lenders willingness to grant a waiver to firms with lower estimated probability of 
bankruptcy.  Violations that occur after a waiver has been obtained in a previous period may 
increase the likelihood of bankruptcy and, in turn, the cost of a DCV.  Thus, strings of violations 
may be associated with increasingly negative stock price reactions.  On the other hand, if the 
market internalizes most of the cost of a DCV at the first implied violation then I expect that 
subsequent implied DCVs will produce less negative price reactions. That is, market pricing of 
the cost of an implied DCV that is inferred from a current earnings announcement is, in large 
part, pre-empted by a similar implied violation on an earlier earnings announcement date.  
The argument that investors learn only marginal information about the future costs of 
violation after an implied DCV or, alternatively, an increased probability of an actual violation, 
leads to my second hypothesis: 
 
H2:   The negative stock market reaction to an implied debt covenant violation will be 
attenuated for firms that have previously reported earnings that implied a violation. 
 
 In the same way that equity investors’ reaction to repeated violations may be tempered 
relative to their reaction to news of initial violations, their reaction to news that indicates a 
recovery in performance that may preclude the possibility of a violation may be positive. 
11 
 
Violation reversals are defined as the occurrence of an implied or disclosed violation in one 
period followed by a lack of implied violation in the next.
 10
    Formally, I predict: 
 
H3:   There is a positive stock market reaction when a previous period implied debt covenant 
violation reverses. 
 
Beneish and Press (1995) find that announcements of technical default of debt covenants 
are associated with significant stock price declines.  In their sample, the SEC filing date of the 
10-K or NT 10-K represents the disclosure date for over 60% of observations; the remaining 
public disclosures of a violation are gleaned from news media reports.  Griffin, Lont, and 
McClune (2010) also find that firms delay disclosure of covenant violations, typically reporting 
them in the 10-K or 10-Q. I verify that there is a similar concentration of public disclosures in 
the financial statements in the sample employed in this study.  Earnings-based debt covenant 
violations comprise less than 7% of Beneish and Press’ sample. I argue that for my sample of 
earnings-based covenant firms information about a possible DCV can be inferred well before 
financial statements are filed with the SEC. If implied violations on earnings announcement 
dates preempt the information in actual violations reported on an SEC filing date, then I predict 
the market reaction to the actual DCV announcement will be attenuated relative to firms that did 
not have an implied DCV before the filing date.
11
 This leads to my final hypothesis. 
                                                          
10 As noted earlier, Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) document positive abnormal returns in the months after the 
announcement of an actual DCV.  Lender intervention that may have lead to increases in firm efficiency, a reduction 
in negative NPV projects, and decreases in value-reducing manager behavior could have been the cause of improved 
performance associated with the reversal. 
11 
I investigate a random sample of over 100 firm quarters for which a violation is disclosed in the financial 
statements.  A news media article disclosing violation precedes the financial statement filing in approximately 3% of 
this hand-collected sample.  The low incidence of filing date preemption mitigates concerns that focusing on the 
SEC filing date is too restrictive.  Robustness tests reported later for firms with other accounting-based covenants 
12 
 
 
H4:   The negative stock price reaction to an actual announcement of a debt covenant 
violation will be attenuated for firms for which it was possible to infer debt covenant 
violation on a previous earnings announcement date. 
 
3. Sample and Variable Definition  
3.1. Covenant Choice  
My empirical strategy is to investigate whether the market identifies and reacts to 
earnings announcements that imply a debt covenant violation.  I focus my analysis on one 
particular earnings-based debt covenant, debt-to-EBITDA for two reasons. First, it is the most 
common debt covenant in Dealscan, a dataset of private debt agreements created by the 
Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation (TRLPC).  A debt-to-EBITDA covenant is included 
in almost half of all loan agreements with financial covenants.  A second reason for focusing on 
debt-to-EBITDA is the high frequency with which information is provided in earnings 
announcements that can be used to update the estimated slack in a relevant covenant benchmark. 
 Prior research has shown an increase in disclosures concurrent with earnings 
announcements (Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2002).  To assess the availability of data to 
calculate debt-to-EBITDA relative to other covenants I hand-collected 50 random earnings 
announcements from my sample and identified the frequency with which components of widely-
used debt covenants are disclosed. Panel A of table 1 indicates that 30% of the earnings 
announcements in the random sample provided no covenant component information other than 
earnings.  EBITDA was explicitly disclosed in 12% of announcements. Tax expense appeared in 
almost two-thirds of the earnings announcements and interest expense appeared in half the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
provides additional evidence that preemption of the filing date reaction by other firm disclosures related to DCV is 
unlikely. 
13 
 
announcements.  In contrast, the most commonly reported non-earnings covenant information 
was current assets and liabilities, which appeared in 38% of the sampled earnings 
announcements (always together).  Updated debt and equity amounts appeared in less than a 
third of announcements, but not always together.  Covenant components pertaining to capital 
expenditures, tangible assets, and cash holdings appeared in almost no earnings 
announcements.
12
 
 I compared the reported covenant components to the numbers reported in the firms 
subsequently filed financial statements to establish the reliability of earnings announcement date 
disclosures. Panel B of Table 1 reports how frequently reported components were equal to the 
actual components that appeared in the financial statements.  I observed differences for 21% of 
the sample.  For the firms that reported the same components in the earnings announcement as in 
the financial statements, there was an aggregation or scale change in 53% of the observations.  
For example, interest income and expense was commonly netted in the earnings announcement.   
Overall, the evidence in table 1 suggests that actual earnings and other disclosures on 
earnings announcement dates allow reliable updating of the debt-to-EBITDA ratio substantially 
more frequently than other covenant values.   
 
3.2. Implied Violation Variable Definition 
To test the hypothesis of whether the market is able to use earnings information disclosed 
on the earnings announcement date to predict subsequent disclosure of DCV it is necessary to 
construct a measure of implied DCV.  I construct this measure using the reported earnings from 
                                                          
12
 Note that no firm that eventually disclosed a covenant violation in their financial statements for this random 
sample disclosed the violation in the preceding earnings announcement. 
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the announcement, other information available at the earnings announcement date, and debt 
covenant specific information from Dealscan.   
The two components needed to construct a measure of implied violation are debt-to-
EBITDA and the outstanding covenant ratio listed in Dealscan at the date of the announcement.  
The debt-to-EBITDA ratio contains several components that may not be available to the market 
at the earnings announcement date.  As indicated above, while some firms disclose debt, interest, 
taxes, depreciation, amortization, or EBITDA at the earnings announcement, the majority do not.  
To ensure no look-ahead bias, I assume that only earnings are reported at the earnings 
announcement date in constructing my measure of implied DCV.  I use prior period values for all 
components of Debt-to-EBITDA except earnings.  Thus, on the earnings announcement date, 
reported earnings can be added to the implied violation measure to create an updated value of 
implied violation. 
The second component needed to calculate my measure of implied violation is the 
contract-specific covenant value from the debt agreement.  This contracted covenant value 
remains constant for each firm until a new debt issue is available.  If a different covenant 
threshold is stated in the new debt agreement, the value changes to reflect the new stated contract 
value.  Taken together, the two components create a firm-specific measure of implied violation 
that is updated quarterly and is calculated as follows: 
 
IDCVi,t = Cov_Ratioi,t – (LTD i,t -1 + CurrLTD i,t -1 / NIt + Interest i,t -1 + Taxi,t -1 + DepAmorti,t -1)  (1) 
 
where,  IDCVi.t  is implied debt covenant violation for firm i in quarter t constructed on the 
quarter t earnings announcement date;  Cov_Ratioi,t is the maximum allowable value of debt-to-
15 
 
EBITDA for firm i in quarter t before a technical violation occurs and,  LTDi, t-1 is long-term debt 
CurrLTDi,t-1 is the current portion of long-term, Interesti,t-1, is interest expense, Taxi, t-1 is tax 
expense and  DepAmori,t -1 is depreciation and amortization for firm i at the end of the previous 
quarter.  NIt is the earnings announced that investors have the potential to use to update their 
expectations about a DCV.
13
 
 While the estimate of IDCV is based on reported earnings, as well as earnings and 
balance sheet components and debt agreement covenant values available on the earnings 
announcement dates, there are reasons to question the precision of the measure used to predict 
subsequent actual DCVs.   First, the use of quarter-old accounting data may limit the ability of 
the measure to predict subsequently disclosed DSVs.  Second, the measure may be coarse 
because many debt contracts use transformed values of GAAP, not actual GAAP values (see, 
e.g., Leftwich 1983, Murfin, 2009, Chava and Roberts 2009).  These concerns will bias against 
the ability of IDCV to predict subsequent DCV disclosure because of measurement error.  To 
mitigate the effects of the noise in IDCV, I rank IDCV and create an indicator variable that is 
equal to 1 if IDCV is in the most extreme quintile in a given year.
14
  This new variable, 
Implied_Violation, takes a value of 1 for the observations that most likely represent a covenant 
violation.   
The use of Implied_Violation can lead to both Type 1 and Type 2 errors, that is, it could 
be incorrectly classify non-violating firms as violating and vice versa.  However, I have no 
                                                          
13 
Negative values of EBITDA can produce large positive values of implied slack.  Negative values of EBITDA 
occur in 4% of firm-quarter observations.  Inferences do not change when these observations are removed. 
14
 Inferences do not change when the most extreme quartile or decile is used. 
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reason to believe that this potential misclassification will be systematically related to 
announcement date abnormal returns. 
 
3.3. Data and Sample Selection 
The private debt contracts represented in the Dealscan database represent a large source 
of corporate funds for these firms.  Sufi (2007), reports that 90% of the 500 largest nonfinancial 
firms in COMPUSTAT obtained a loan through private channels between 1994 and 2002.  The 
market for these loans grew to over $1 trillion by the end of his sample period. The value of 
these loans grew to over $1.5 trillion by 2005 (see Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008)).  I use all 
the debt issues of public firms in the Dealscan database that have loans with a debt-to-EBITDA 
covenant.  Dealscan provides a unique package identification number for each debt issue as well 
as a company identification number and the stock ticker.  I conduct my tests at the firm-deal 
level.
15
  I match these tickers with the COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases to create a dataset 
that includes all the loan information from Dealscan and all the financial statement information 
from COMPUSTAT and returns data from CRSP.  I require each debt issue observation to have 
all the required COMPUSTAT and CRSP data.  I truncate earnings at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles 
to remove any unwarranted impact of outliers.   I include all the firm-quarters during the time 
period for which I have loan data that have non-missing COMPUSTAT and CRSP data for each 
of the firms with at least one private debt issue containing a debt-to-EBITDA covenant.   
                                                          
15
The deal-level analysis decision is consistent with prior research and motivated in two ways.  First, syndicated loan 
contracts are drafted at the deal level.  All covenants and lenders are listed together on this contract regardless of the 
number of facilities (loans or lines of credit), so this is the relevant unit of observation.  Second, analysis conducted 
at the facility level would bias standard errors downward because the same firm is associated with multiple 
observations (see Sufi 2007 and Murfin 2009). 
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In preliminary tests I validate my measure of Implied Violation using a sample of known 
violators to provide assurance that it captures the construct of interest. The sample of known 
violators is the same used by Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009). SEC filing dates are obtained from 
this source and verified using Perl to scan the SEC website.
16
 These data cover the period from 
1997 to 2007, which begins when firms were required to file financial statement electronically 
with the SEC. Firms in the financial industry are excluded from the sample. The Nini, Smith, and 
Sufi sample consists of firm with DCVs that are disclosed in the financial statements.   
I require sample observations to have all necessary Dealscan, COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and 
disclosed violation data.  In addition, because my empirical design relies on the ability of the 
market to infer DCV from reported earnings before firm disclosure of violation in the financial 
statements, I require the SEC filing date to occur after the earnings announcement date for all 
observations.  The final sample consists of 1,354 debt issues in Dealscan from 1997 to 2006.  
These 1,354 debt issues involve 716 unique firms.  Descriptive statistics summarizing the effect 
of sample selection criteria on sample sizes are reported in table 2.   
 
3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the sample data.  Panel A reports that sample 
firms have an average of 2.77 financial covenants per debt issue.  The minimum allowable 
number of financial debt covenants is one, because all debt agreements must have at least a debt-
to EBITDA covenant in order to be included in the sample.  The maximum number of financial 
covenants in this sample is seven.  The average loan size in the sample is $434M, and the 
                                                          
16
 I am grateful to Greg Nini, David Smith, and Amir Sufi for making these data publicly available.  The data can be 
found on Amir Sufi’s website {http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/}.  Please refer to the appendix in Nini et 
al. (2009) for more information about how the sample was collected and how it can be interpreted.    
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average interest-spread is 211 basis points.  The average contracted covenant value for debt-to-
EBITDA is 3.72. 
 Panel B of table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the DCV 
prediction model as well as the abnormal returns specifications.  Covenant violations (VIOL) are 
reported in approximately 5% of the quarterly financial statements for the sample firms.  This 
compares to the 7% of firm-quarter observations with a covenant violation found by Nini, Smith 
and Sufi, (2009).  Implied violations occur in 20% of firm quarters.  This rate is not surprising 
since the Implied_Violation variable is defined as the most extreme quintile of implied covenant 
slack.   
 The average quarterly earnings for the sample are just over $10M, and the sample firms 
experience losses in 18% of firm quarters. This percentage is slightly less than the 25% 
documented by Hayn (1995).   Average assets are $1,990M, and the average return on assets is 
approximately 1%.  As expected, the firms contained in the sample are relatively large.  The 
average current ratio and interest coverage ratios are 1.92 and 7.10 respectively. By comparison, 
the sample firms used in Dyreng (2009) have an average current ratio of 2.02 and an average 
interest coverage ratio of 8.45. 
 I estimate abnormal returns as the 3-day average market model residuals around the 
event date - here the earnings announcement and financial statement filing dates - following the 
technique described in Collins, Li, and Xie (2009).  Firms experience an average earnings 
announcement day abnormal return of 0.5%.  The average financial statement filing date 
abnormal return is -0.1%.  On average, the financial statements are filed approximately 19 days 
after the earnings announcement. 
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 Panel C provides a correlation matrix for all of the variables.  Disclosed violations are 
negatively associated with earnings announcement abnormal returns, interest coverage, earnings 
surprise, return on assets, and the natural log of assets and positively associated with losses.  In 
general, implied earnings-based debt covenant violations are correlated in the same direction as 
disclosed violations.  Notable exceptions are earnings surprise (SUE) and the natural log of 
assets.  This may capture some of the fundamental differences between earnings-based debt 
covenant firms and “other” covenant firms.  More important, disclosed violation and implied 
violation are positively correlated, providing a preliminary indication that the measure of implied 
violation is a reasonable predictor of disclosed violation. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Implied Violation Measure Validation 
Before testing my hypotheses, I validate the predictive ability of the Implied_Violation 
variable using the following logistic regression (firm subscripts omitted in the remainder of the 
paper): 
 
VIOLt+δ = α0 + α1Implied_Violationt + αkCONTROLSt  + γt     (2)  
 
where, VIOL is an indicator variable set to 1 if a firm i disclosed a debt covenant violation in its 
financial statements for quarter t and 0 otherwise, and δ takes on the values of 0 to 4.   
If Implied_Violation correctly identifies firms that publicly disclose a debt covenant 
violation, then values of Implied_Violation equal to 1 should indicate a higher likelihood of 
future DCV disclosure in the financial statements and the coefficient, α1, will be positive.  
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Focusing on the likelihood of DCV, regardless of whether the firm is in actual technical 
violation, is important because a violating firm may obtain a waiver or renegotiate the terms of 
the load without ever disclosing a violation in its financial statements. However, if waivers or 
renegotiations are costly, stock returns may impound this information when there is an implied 
DCV.     
Several firm-specific characteristics are included as controls in EQ. (2) for other 
predictors of actual DCVs. Many of these variables have significant explanatory power.  Larger 
firms and firms with a higher market-to-book ratio are less likely to have an actual DCV, 
suggesting larger and more established firms are less susceptible to violation or have a greater 
ability to negotiate with lenders to obtain a waiver or a renegotiated contract.  The probability of 
and actual DCV decreases with current and last period ROA, although the coefficient on last 
period’s ROA is not statistically significant.  I also include several of the variables proposed by 
Dyreng (2009) that control for other common debt covenants, such as current ratio and interest 
coverage covenants.
17
  Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009) reports that the 10-K is often a “catch-all” 
report in which firms report information that is not reported in the shorter quarterly reports.  I 
include quarter fixed effects in addition to year fixed effects to control for differential quarterly 
reporting, and I cluster robust standard errors at the firm level. 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating EQ. (2).  The coefficient on Implied_Violation 
is positive and significant, which indicates that an implied violation at the earnings 
announcement date increases the probability of a firm disclosing a covenant violation in the 
subsequently filed financial statements.  The measure of implied violation correctly identified 
                                                          
17
 Dyreng (2009) also controls for leverage.  This variable has very little explanatory power for my sample of firms 
with a Debt-to-EBITDA covenant, so I omit it.  I include leverage as a control variable for the additional sample of 
current ratio covenant firms.  These firms have a higher incidence of leverage covenants in their debt contracts. 
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155 of these violations.  Random assignment of firms into implied violation status would have 
correctly identified 95 violators. This finding provides evidence that the market has the potential 
to use information to update their expectation of existing slack in earnings-based covenants on 
the earnings announcement date. 
The evidence in table 4 also indicates that Implied_Violation measure has the ability to 
predict actual DCV at least two quarters ahead.  Specifications 2 through 5 present logistic 
regression results for VIOLt+1 through VIOLt+4.  The coefficient on Implied_Violation is positive 
and significant in the t+1 and t+2 specifications, and positive but insignificant in the t+3 and t+4 
specifications.  The magnitude of the coefficients decreases monotonically over time, consistent 
with a decreasing timeliness in the predictive ability of Implied_Violation.   
Note that the coefficient on the indicator variable for losses, Losst in the quarter is 
significant and negative across most specifications.  Jiang (2008) investigates the effect of 
beating earnings benchmarks on a firm’s cost of debt.  A main finding of that study is that the 
consequences of beating earnings benchmarks (zero earnings, last year’s earnings, and analysts’ 
forecasts) are different in the debt market and equity markets.  Jiang finds that the loss 
benchmark is the most important in the debt market.  This finding may partially explain the 
strong effect of the loss variable in this specification. 
4.2. Market Reaction to Implied Debt Covenant Violations 
The first hypothesis predicts that implied covenant violations will be associated with 
negative stock price reactions.  To test this hypothesis I estimate the following OLS regression: 
 
EA_CARt = α0 + α1Implied_Violationt + αkCONTROLSt  + εt    (3) 
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where,  EA_CARt is firm i’s 3-day abnormal cumulative return centered on the earnings 
announcement date for quarter t, and Implied_Violation is as previously defined.   
I include a variety of variables in the regression to control for other determinants of 
abnormal returns.  To control for financial information arriving to the market at the earnings 
announcement date I include controls for losses (Hayn, 1995), earnings and lagged earnings 
(scaled by assets). I also control for firm characteristics, including size and market-to-book 
(Skinner and Sloan 2002, Fama and French 1992) and include controls for the most common 
non-earnings based debt covenants, current ratio and interest coverage.  To control for the 
information content of earnings announcements I include SUE, abnormal return variance, and a 
measure of abnormal trading volume (Beaver 1968, Landsman and Maydew 2002, and Collins, 
Li, and Xie 2009). Finally, I ensure that for a random subset of my sample firms there was no 
explicit disclosure of a DCV on the earnings announcement date.   
Table 5 presents the results for tests of H1.  As predicted, the coefficient on 
Implied_Violation is significantly negative and it indicates that firms with an implied covenant 
violation experience a negative .83% announcement abnormal return incremental to the impact 
of the news in earnings surprise and other variables directly associated with the information 
content of earnings.
18
 This result is consistent with a negative stock price reaction to 
announcement of actual DCVs on SEC filing dates and news media disclosures in the prior 
literature.  Note that the incremental impact of losses and the market-to-book ratio on abnormal 
returns is also negative, while the incremental impact of ROA is positive, consistent with prior 
research.  The addition of the control variables significantly increases the explanatory power of 
                                                          
18
I present multiple specifications for each hypothesis to allow the reader to observe the incremental effect of adding 
control variables.  I focus my discussion for each hypothesis test on the specification which includes all the control 
variables (the last column in each table). 
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the model (in particular the addition of abnormal return variance and trading volume) without 
altering the inference that implied DCV are associated with negative price responses. 
 
4.3. Market Reaction to Repeat Violations and Violation Reversal 
H2 predicts that the negative stock market reaction to an implied debt covenant violation 
will be attenuated for firms that have previously reported earnings that implied a violation.  To 
test this hypothesis I estimate the following OLS regression: 
 
EA_CARt = α0 + α1Implied_Violationt + α2PP_IDCVt     + α3 Implied_Violation*PP_IDCVt      
 +  αkCONTROLSt  + εt         (4) 
 
Where, PP_IDCVt  is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if  firm i has had a prior period 
implied covenant violation. Specifically, PP_IDCV  is equal to 1 if Implied_Violation has been 
equal to 1 in any of the last four quarters.  The interaction Implied_Violation * PP_IDCV 
captures the incremental stock reaction for firms that are likely to have violated in the current 
period that likely violated an earnings-based covenant in a previous period.  H2 predicts that α3 
will be positive, indicating that a smaller negative reaction to an implied violation for firms that 
have previously had an implied violation. In this test I also control for any actual covenant 
violations disclosed in the financial statements within the last four quarters. I also include year 
fixed effects indicators and cluster robust standard errors by firm. 
 Table 6 presents the results for tests of H2.  The dependent variable is again the 3-day 
abnormal return centered on the earnings announcement date.  The coefficient on the interaction 
term of interest is positive and significant, consistent with the hypothesis.  Note that the 
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coefficient on Implied_Violation is again negative and significant, indicating that firms without 
prior implied debt covenant violations experience a -1.59% abnormal return, which is almost 
twice as large as the estimate produced in tests of H1.   
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that firms that report earnings that imply a reversal in the 
likelihood of an earnings-based debt covenant violation will experience a positive stock price 
reaction. I create an indicator variable, DCV_Reversal, that is equal to one for firms that had an 
implied violation or disclosed a violation in the previous quarter and do not have an implied 
violation in the current period.  I test H3 by estimating the following regression: 
 
EA_CARt = α0 + α1DCV_Reversalt + αkCONTROLSt  + εt     (5) 
 
Table 7 presents results for tests of H3.  The coefficient on DCV_Reversal is positive and 
significant, indicating a positive abnormal return for firms with a reversal in an implied violation 
between earnings announcements.   
 
4.4. Market Reaction to Covenant Violation Disclosed in the Financial Statements 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the negative stock price reaction to an actual announcement of 
a debt covenant violation will be attenuated for firms for which it was possible to infer a debt 
covenant violation at the earnings announcement date.  To test this hypothesis, I estimate the 
following OLS regression: 
 
SEC_CARt = α0 + α1VIOLt + αkCONTROLSt + εt      (6) 
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Where, SEC_CARt is firm i’s 3-day abnormal cumulative return centered on the financial 
statement filing date for quarter t, and VIOL is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a 
covenant violation was disclosed in the financial statements for the quarter.  Recall that VIOL is 
the dependent variable in the logit models used to validate the implied violation measure.   
Table 8 presents the results of tests of H4.  Models 1 and 2 are used to estimate the 
market reaction to the disclosure of a DCV for firms with an actual earnings-based covenant and 
an implied covenant violation, respectively.  I predict that the coefficient on disclosed violations 
will be smaller for these firms than for firms without an earnings-based covenant or implied 
covenant violation.  The coefficient on VIOL is indistinguishable from zero in both 
specifications.  This table provides strong evidence of the absence of a negative reaction to DCV 
disclosure in the financial statements for firms with an earnings-based debt covenant, suggesting 
earnings information preempts the impact of an actual DCV disclosure, consistent with H4. 
 
4.5. Alternative Explanations and Additional Tests 
The motivation for this study is to assess whether the market has the ability to infer 
changes in the probability of DCV at the announcement of earnings for firms that have earnings-
based debt covenants.   Hypothesis 4 predicts and finds that there is no negative reaction to 
disclosed DCVs for these firms.  One potential explanation for the absence of a negative reaction 
is a change in the information environment of borrowing firms since Beneish and Press (1995) 
conducted their investigation. The time period examined in their study, 1983 to 1987, does not 
overlap with the period I study. Thus, it is possible that a general improvement in firm 
information environment subsequent to the period studied by Beneish and Press may account for 
the result.  It may also be the case that managers are more likely in the later time period to 
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release DCV information.  Skinner (1994) finds that managers have incentives to preempt large 
negative earnings surprises by disclosing this information early.  He finds that litigation and 
reputational costs increase when investors are surprised by bad news.  These litigation and 
reputational costs may have increased compared to the period in the sample of Beneish and 
Press.  Managers facing these costs may choose to disclose information about DCV before the 
filing of the financial statements.
19
   
I estimate EQ. (6) using the full sample of disclosed violations provided by Nini, Smith 
and Sufi (2009) that have the required Compustat and CRSP data to verify that the market reacts, 
on average negatively to an actual DCV in the manner reported in Beneish and Press (1995) and 
report the results in Table 9.  The first specification uses every available observation, and the 
second specification removes all observations that were used in my sample, i.e., all the firms that 
had a debt-to-EBITDA covenant.  The disclosure of a violation is associated with a significant 
negative abnormal return on the financial statement filing date.  Both specifications yield an 
abnormal return of approximately negative .45% after controlling for financial, risk, and market 
factors.  This table provides results consistent with the market reacting to the disclosure of 
covenant violations in the financial statements and mitigates concerns that the market reaction to 
DCV disclosure has changed over time.   
A second alternative explanation for my findings is that in constructing a sample of firms 
that have an earnings-based debt covenant in Dealscan, I may have captured artifacts peculiar to 
“Dealscan” firms that account for the fact that I observe no market reaction to DCV on SEC 
filing dates.  For example, firms in the Dealscan database may be fundamentally different than 
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 Recall, however, that the hand-collection sample of firm disclosures around earnings announcements and financial 
statement filing dates provided little evidence of firm disclosure about covenant violation before the financial 
statement filing date.   
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those used in the Beneish and Press sample because the Dealscan database is composed of 
private debt contracts and some prior studies conclude that private debt has advantages over 
public debt with respect to monitoring efficiency, access to private information, and the ease of 
liquidation and renegotiation in periods of financial distress (see, e.g., Denis and Mihov, 2003). 
In contrast, the sample employed in Beneish and Press (1995) contained both public and private 
debt agreements. However, the preponderance of firms in their sample had private lending, 
making it less likely that the absence of public debt in my sample accounts for differences.
20
   
While it is unlikely that sample composition and period differences account for the 
absence of a market reaction to debt covenant violations on SEC filing dates, I address these 
concerns by constructing a sample of 277 firms with debt contracts covered in Dealscan for 
which there are only non-earnings-based debt covenants.  In particular, all of the firms in this 
subsample have a current ratio debt covenant.  Additional accounting-based debt covenants also 
included in the debt agreements (of the current ratio firms) are maximum allowable capital 
expenditure, maximum debt-to-equity, and maximum debt-to-net worth.  This sample covers the 
same time period as my main sample.   I predict that the market’s ability to infer the likelihood of 
DCV on the earnings announcement date will be weaker than for the earnings-based covenant 
sample.  In addition, the disclosure of DCV on the SEC filing date should be more informative to 
the market. If there is a negative stock price reaction to the disclosure of DCV for this sample of 
firms, it will mitigate some of the concerns discussed above and strengthen the argument that the 
lack of market response on the SEC filing date for the main sample is attributable the market 
inferring information about a potential earnings-based violation on the earnings announcement 
date. 
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 Beneish and Press (1993) state that 87of the 91 firms in their sample had private debt agreements (pg. 235). 
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 The results reported in table 10 for Model 1 for which announcement abnormal returns 
on the SEC filing date serve as the depend variable are consistent this argument. For the sample 
of firms with an accounting-based debt covenant, there is a significant (at the 7% level), negative 
stock price reaction to the disclosure of DCV in the financial statements.  A negative reaction is 
observed after controlling for other common accounting-based covenants such as leverage and 
capital expenditure.   
Table 10 reports results for Model (2), which estimates the market response to earnings 
announced prior to an SEC filing date. The model intentionally exploits look-ahead bias by 
including an indicator for firms that eventually violate the current ratio covenant.  The evidence 
from this model indicates there is no market reaction on the preceding earnings announcement 
date. 
Overall, table 10 provides evidence that for firms with a non-earnings-based debt 
covenant violation, there is a negative stock price reaction on the filing date but no reaction of 
the earnings announcement date.  These results reinforce the conclusion drawn from the evidence 
in table 8, that the lack of a significant price reaction to the disclosure of DCV on the SEC filing 
date for firms with an earnings-based debt covenant is attributed to preemptive information 
provided in earnings announcements.   
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper I construct a measure with information in firms’ earnings announcements 
that successfully predicts the incidence of subsequent earnings-based debt covenant violations.  I 
predict and find that the market is able to infer likely earnings-based debt covenant violations on 
the earnings announcement date using publicly available information.  These implied debt 
29 
 
covenant violations are associated with significant negative stock price reactions on the earnings 
announcement date.  I also find that the stock price reaction to implied violation is smaller when 
an implied violation has occurred in the previous four quarters.  These results complement the 
findings of prior studies that report negative stock price reactions to the announcement of DCVs. 
In contrast to evidence in prior studies I find no evidence of a negative market reaction to the 
disclosure of a DCV on the SEC filing date in the case of firms with and implied earnings-based 
DCV.  
Analysis of the implicit and explicit costs of DCV in prior studies typically begins with 
samples of firms that disclose an actual debt covenant violation. The market reaction to the 
disclosure is commonly used as a proxy for the cost of a violation. However, my results suggest 
that to the extent that the market can exploit publically available accounting information to infer 
a DCV that is subsequently disclosed (or occurred but was settled by waiver, renegotiation, or 
shifting of control rights), market reactions on the date of disclosure will understate the total 
costs of DCV in the cross-section.  
I also find evidence that the market reacts less negatively to information about a possible 
covenant violation when an implied DCV has been observed in the previous period.  This 
evidence suggests additional complications in using market returns over given event windows to 
gauge the costs of debt covenant violations, because it is not clear when information becomes 
“public.”  Further complication in assessing the cost of DCVs is suggested by evidence that 
investors react positively to accounting information that implies a reversal in the probability of 
an earnings-based debt covenant.  
 This study extends the literature that documents a negative stock price reaction to the 
announcement of debt covenant violation.  I show that negative price reactions to information 
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that implies debt covenant violations occur in advance of actual disclosures. Robustness tests 
confirm that my results are not likely to be an artifact of changes in the information environment 
of firms with private debt over time or differences in characteristics of sample firms or loan types 
covered by Dealscan and those of firms on which conclusions from the prior literature have been 
drawn.   
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Table 1:  Earnings Announcement Covenant Component Disclosure*
Panel A:  This panel presents descriptive statistics for debt covenant data  reported
in the earnings announcement.
Disclosure Item
% of firms 
disclosing
Earnings 100%
Only Earnings (No other covenant components)** 30%
DCV Disclosure*** 0%
Only IS Info 31%
EBITDA 12%
Interest 50%
Tax Expense 62%
Depreciation & Amortization 30%
Equity 34%
LTD 30%
Current Portion of LTD 2%
Current Liabilities 38%
Current Assets 38%
Intangible Assets 0%
Capital Expenditure 2%
Cash & Equivalents 6%
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Panel B:  This panel provides statistics comparing covenant data from the financial statements
 to data reported in the earnings announcement.
Comparison Metric % of firms
Firms reporting the same 
information in the financial 
statements that was reported in 
the earnings announcement 79%
Firms reporting different 
information in the financial 
statements that was reported in 
the earnings announcement 21%
Firms reporting the same 
information in the financial 
statements that aggragated 
covenant component information 
or significantly altered the 
reporting units of measurement 53%
 
*I search for components of the following covenants: capital expenditure, debt-to-EBITDA, 
leverage, cash interest coverage, current ratio, interest coverage. 
**The percent of firms that disclose no covenant component information other than earnings.  
These firms may disclose other financial information. 
 
***The percent of firms that disclose a debt covenant violation at the earnings announcement 
that will eventually disclose violation in the financial statements. 
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Table 2: Sample selection 
Panel A:  This panel presents the effect of sample selection criteria on the loan sample size. 
Filters Number of Loans 
All loans with a borrowing firm  
ticker 42,315 
Loans with Debt-to EBITDA  
covenant 8,631 
Match with Compustat identifier,  
eliminate firms without loan  
identifier, eliminate loans issued  
outside of sample period 1997 to  
2006 1,978 
Eliminate Loans with missing data 1,354 
Panel B:This panel presents the effect of sample selection criteria on firm-quarter sample size. 
Filters Number of Firm-Quarters 
All firm-quarter observations from  
Panel A  15,782 
Eliminate firms that report earnings  
on the same day they file their  
financial statements 13,515 
Eliminate firms with missing data and  
truncate variables 11,440 
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Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Loan Characteristics
Loan Characteristics:
Number of 
Observations Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl
Number of Financial Covenants 1,354 2.77 1.01 2.00 3.00 3.00
Loan Size (in millions ) 1,354 434.14 1,069.23 75.00 190.00 400.00
Interest Spread (in bps) 1,290 211.53 55.58 200.00 200.00 200.00
Number of Lenders 1,220 55.01 7.34 51.00 51.00 51.00
Panel B: Sample Characteristics
N = 11,440
VIOL (Disclosed Violation ) 0.047 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00
Implied_Violation 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
NI t  (in millions) 10.04 359.76 0.87 6.30 19.33
NI t-1 (in millions) 11.28 263.05 0.80 5.95 18.43
Loss t-1 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
Int_Coverage t-1 7.10 1.62 0.19 2.04 5.95
SUE t 0.002 0.049 -0.005 0.000 0.006
ROA t 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02
Assets t-1  (in millions) 1,990.92 25.20 0.41 681.76 1,646.40
Ln_Assets t-1 6.54 1.36 5.67 6.50 7.38
Curr_Ratio t-1 1.92 1.10 1.19 1.70 2.40
Cov_Ratio 3.72 1.45 3.00 3.50 4.50
Ln_MVE t 6.30 1.52 5.35 6.35 7.27
Ln_MTB t-1 0.70 0.81 0.21 0.67 1.14
EA_CAR t 0.01 0.09 -0.04 0.00 0.05
SEC_CAR t 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.02
EA_AVAR 14.28 29.45 1.85 5.04 13.59
EA_AVOL 3.45 6.28 -0.24 1.57 4.89
File_Announce_Difference 18.94 13.95 9.00 16.00 25.00  
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Panel D: Correlation Matrix
VIOL 
(Disclosed 
Violation )
Implied_Violation EA_CAR ROA t ROA t-1 Loss t SUE MTB Ln_Assets t-1
VIOL (Disclosed Violation ) 0.058 -0.040 -0.151 -0.095 0.217 -0.029 -0.121 -0.099
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.002 <.0001 <.0001
Implied_Violation 0.058 -0.030 -0.101 -0.102 0.149 0.027 -0.109 0.138
<.0001 0.002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.004 <.0001 <.0001
EA_CAR -0.040 -0.030 0.063 0.003 -0.075 0.020 -0.023 -0.008
<.0001 0.002 <.0001 0.720 <.0001 0.035 0.014 0.382
ROA t -0.151 -0.101 0.063 0.261 -0.499 0.334 0.302 -0.011
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.236
ROA t-1 -0.095 -0.102 0.003 0.261 -0.241 -0.371 0.245 0.008
<.0001 <.0001 0.720 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.403
Loss t 0.217 0.149 -0.075 -0.499 -0.241 -0.101 -0.228 -0.027
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.004
SUE -0.029 0.027 0.020 0.334 -0.371 -0.101 0.042 -0.007
0.002 0.004 0.035 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.448
MTB -0.121 -0.109 -0.023 0.302 0.245 -0.228 0.042 0.098
<.0001 <.0001 0.014 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Ln_Assets t-1 -0.099 0.138 -0.008 -0.011 0.008 -0.027 -0.007 0.098
<.0001 <.0001 0.382 0.236 0.403 0.004 0.448 <.0001
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Table 4:  Debt Covenant Violation Prediction Logit Regression Results
Probability Modeled: VIOL = 1
VARIABLES
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>ChiSqr
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>ChiSqr
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>ChiSqr
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr > ChiSq
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>ChiSqr
Intercept -0.6559 0.0889 -0.8754 0.0322 -0.8150 0.0548 -1.0812 0.0137 -1.2564 0.0074
Implied_Violation 0.6473 <.0001 0.5749 0.0003 0.5270 0.0019 0.2395 0.1897 0.0595 0.7674
ROA t -8.1109 <.0001 -5.5113 0.0002 -8.0764 <.0001 -8.1518 <.0001 -2.9573 0.0767
ROA t-1 -1.4559 0.1408 -0.7396 0.5132 1.1319 0.3912 1.4751 0.2983 -2.2539 0.0783
Loss t-1 0.7962 <.0001 0.9752 <.0001 0.5266 0.0023 0.3242 0.0629 0.4878 0.0176
Int_Coverage t-1 0.0002 0.0884 0.0001 0.3432 0.0000 0.7830 0.0000 0.6701 0.0002 0.0665
SUE 0.2490 0.2822 -0.2490 0.2556 1.1480 0.0235 1.1565 0.0144 -0.3913 0.0630
MTB t -0.3948 0.0004 -0.3222 0.0024 -0.3435 0.0009 -0.3097 0.0049 -0.2569 0.0192
Ln_Assets t-1 -0.3609 <.0001 -0.3237 <.0001 -0.3134 <.0001 -0.3020 <.0001 -0.2901 <.0001
Curr_Ratio t-1 -0.0960 0.1124 -0.0298 0.6195 -0.0398 0.5292 0.0009 0.9885 -0.0198 0.7782
Cov_Ratio -0.0401 0.4410 -0.0744 0.1893 -0.0509 0.4292 -0.0506 0.4275 -0.0432 0.5425
Fixed Effects
Clustered SE
N VIOL=0
N VIOL=1
R-squared
Max-rescaled R-Squared
0.0254 0.0222
0.1398 0.1118 0.0894 0.082
0.0505
0.16
Yr, Qtr Yr, Qtr Yr, Qtr
Firm Firm Firm
7731 6924 6257
372 306 258
0.0435 0.0331
Yr, Qtr
Firm
9546
473
Yr, Qtr
Firm
5644
216
VIOLt = 1 VIOLt+1 = 1 VIOLt+2 = 1 VIOLt+3 = 1 VIOLt+4 = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Table 4 presents results from a logistic regression of the following model using firm-quarters over the period 1997 
to 2006: 
 
VIOLt+δ = α0 + α1Implied_Violationt + α3ROAt  + α4ROAt-1 + α4Losst + α5Int_Coveraget-1 + α6SUEt-1 +   
α7MTBt-1 + α8Ln_Assetst-1 + α9Curr_Ratiot-1 + α10Cov_Ratiot  + γt    (2) 
 
VIOL is an indicator variable that = 1 if a firm i disclosed a debt covenant violation in its financial statements for 
quarter t and = 0 otherwise and δ takes the values of 0 to 4.  Implied_Violation is an indicator variable that = 1 for 
the most extreme quintile by year of implied covenant slack, constructed on the earnings announcement date for 
quarter t and = 0 otherwise.  ROAt is net income for firm i in quarter t divided by assets in quarter t-1.  ROAt-1  is the 
return on assets for quarter t-1.  Losst  is in indicator variable = 1 if the firm experienced a loss in quarter t.  
Int_Coveraget-1 is the interest coverage ratio for firm i in quarter t-1.  SUE is earnings for quarter t less earnings for 
quarter t-1 scaled by the market value of equity in quarter t-1 for firm i.  Ln_Assetst-1 is the natural log of assets for 
quarter t-i.  Curr_Ratiot-1is current assets divided by current liabilities for quarter t-1.  Cov_Ratio is the maximum 
allowable value of debt-to EBITDA for firm i in quarter t before a technical violation occurs. The standard errors are 
clustered by firm.  Year and quarter fixed effects are included.
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Table 5:  Market Response to Implied Debt Covenant Violation
Dependent Variable: EA_CARt
VARIABLES
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Intercept 0.0066 0.0024 0.0082 0.1438 0.0086 0.2339 0.0077 0.2652
Implied_Violation -0.0066 0.0013 -0.0062 0.0026 -0.0077 0.0009 -0.0083 0.0003
Loss t-1 -0.0092 0.0037 -0.0091 0.0075 -0.0089 0.0103
ROA t 0.1395 0.0231 0.1545 0.0179 0.1641 0.0139
SUE 0.1155 <.0001 0.1149 <.0001 0.1144 <.0001
MTB -0.0060 0.0002 -0.0062 <.0001 -0.0060 <.0001
Ln_Assets t-1 0.0003 0.6959 -0.0003 0.6755 -0.0001 0.9400
Int_Coverage t-1 0.0000 0.3241 0.0000 0.1447
Curr_Ratio t-1 -0.0006 0.5570 -0.0003 0.7577
Cov_Ratio 0.0016 0.0799 0.0017 0.0716
EA_AVAR -0.0019 <.0001
EA_AVOL 0.0003 <.0001
Fixed Effects
Clustered SE
Number of Observations
R-squared
11,440 10,912 9,528 9,528
0.0020 0.0144 0.0155 0.0294
Year Year Year Year
Firm Firm Firm Firm
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Table 5 presents results from the OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings announcements 
over the period 1997 to 2006: 
 
EA_CARt = α0 + α1Implied_Violationt + α2Losst  + α3ROAt   + α4SUEt-1   
+ α5MTB +  α6Ln_Assetst-1 + α7Int_Coveraget-1 + α8Curr_Ratiot-1 + α9Cov_Ratiot   
α10EA_AVARst-1 +  α11EA_AVOLst-1 + γt                                                                                   (3) 
   
EA_CARt is firm i’s 3-day abnormal cumulative return centered on the earnings announcement date for quarter t.  
Implied_Violation is an indicator variable that = 1 for the most extreme quintile by year of implied covenant slack, 
constructed on the earnings announcement date for quarter t and = 0 otherwise.  ROAt is net income for firm i in 
quarter t divided by assets in quarter t-1.   Losst  is in indicator variable = 1 if the firm experienced a loss in quarter t.  
Int_Coveraget-1 is the interest coverage ratio for firm i in quarter t-1 and is truncated at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
SUE is earnings for quarter t less earnings for quarter t-1 scaled by the market value of equity in quarter t-1 for firm i 
and is truncated at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Ln_MVEt-1  is the natural log of the market value of equity for quarter 
t-1.  MTB is the natural log of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in quarter t-1.  
Curr_Ratiot-1is current assets divided by current liabilities for quarter t-1.  Cov_Ratio is the maximum allowable 
value of debt-to-EBITDA for firm i in quarter t before a technical violation occurs. EA_AVAR is the 3-day abnormal 
variance centered around the earnings announcement date for firm i in quarter t.  EA_AVOL is the 3-day abnormal 
trading volume centered around the earnings announcement date for firm i in quarter t.  The standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm.  Year fixed effects are included. 
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Table 6:  Market Response to Implied Debt Covenant Violation
for Repeat Violators
Dependent Variable: EA_CARt
VARIABLES
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Intercept 0.0066 0.0298 0.0063 0.3968 0.0054 0.5440 0.0063 0.4536
Implied_Violation -0.0159 0.0130 -0.0131 0.0473 -0.0147 0.0310 -0.0159 0.0192
PP_IDCV 0.0008 0.7359 0.0006 0.8191 0.0010 0.7115 0.0002 0.9496
Implied_Violation*PP_IDC
V
0.0152 0.0249 0.0138 0.0491 0.0156 0.0309 0.0163 0.0248
Loss t-1 -0.0158 0.0006 -0.0123 0.0070 -0.0118 0.0099
ROA t 0.0732 0.1970 0.1547 0.0039 0.1571 0.0043
ROA t-1 -0.0498 0.3324 -0.0590 0.3848 -0.0569 0.4004
SUE 0.0284 0.0259 0.0287 0.0317 0.0290 0.0278
MTB -0.0030 0.0562 -0.0038 0.0145 -0.0034 0.0340
Ln_Assets t-1 0.0007 0.4396 0.0009 0.3660 0.0013 0.2227
Int_Coverage t-1 0.0000 0.8984 0.0000 0.8797
Curr_Ratio t-1 0.0011 0.3403 0.0013 0.2345
Cov_Ratio -0.0009 0.4584 -0.0010 0.4216
EA_AVAR 0.0003 0.0021
EA_AVOL -0.0020 <.0001
Fixed Effects
Clustered SE
Number of Observations
R-squared
6,913 6,743 5,905 5,905
0.0053 0.0151 0.0190 0.0337
Year Year Year Year
Firm Firm Firm Firm
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Table 6 presents results from the OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings announcements 
over the period 1997 to 2006: 
 
EA_CARt = α0 + α1Implied_Violationt + α2PP_IDCVt  + α3Implied_Violation*PP_IDCVt  + α4Losst   
+ α5ROAt  + α6ROAt-1  + α7SUEt-1  + α8MTB +  α9Ln_Assetst-1 + α10Int_Coveraget-1 + α11Curr_Ratiot-1  
               + α12Cov_Ratiot  + α13EA_AVARst-1 +  α14EA_AVOLst-1 + γt     
                                                                           (4) 
  
EA_CARt is firm i’s 3-day abnormal cumulative return centered on the earnings announcement date for quarter t.  
Implied_Violation is an indicator variable that = 1 for the most extreme quintile by year of implied covenant slack, 
constructed on the earnings announcement date for quarter t and = 0 otherwise.  PP_IDCVt is an indicator variable 
that  = 1 if Implied_Violation = 1 in any of the previous four quarters and = 0 otherwise.  ROAt is net income for 
firm i in quarter t divided by assets in quarter t-1. ROAt-1  is the return on assets for quarter t-1.   Losst  is in indicator 
variable = 1 if the firm experienced a loss in quarter t.  Int_Coveraget-1 is the interest coverage ratio for firm i in 
quarter t-1 and is truncated at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  SUE is earnings for quarter t less earnings for quarter t-1 
scaled by the market value of equity in quarter t-1 for firm i and is truncated at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
Ln_MVEt-1  is the natural log of the market value of equity for quarter t-1.  MTB is the natural log of the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity in quarter t-1.  Curr_Ratiot-1is current assets divided by current 
liabilities for quarter t-1.  Cov_Ratio is the maximum allowable value of debt-to-EBITDA for firm i in quarter t 
before a technical violation occurs. EA_AVAR is the 3-day abnormal variance centered around the earnings 
announcement date for firm i in quarter t.  EA_AVOL is the 3-day abnormal trading volume centered around the 
earnings announcement date for firm i in quarter t.  Controls are included for covenant violation disclosures in the 
financial statements in the previous four quarters.  The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered 
by firm.  Year fixed effects are included. 
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Table 7:  Market Response to Covenant Violation Reversal
Dependent Variable: EA_CARt
VARIABLES
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Coefficient 
Estimate Pr>|t|
Intercept 0.0047 0.0274 0.0107 0.0641 0.0116 0.0810 0.0110 0.0861
DCV_Reversal 0.0072 0.0093 0.0063 0.0293 0.0062 0.0433 0.0063 0.0417
Loss t-1 -0.0112 0.0006 -0.0099 0.0039 -0.0098 0.0054
ROA t 0.0157 0.8219 0.0491 0.4911 0.0576 0.4283
ROA t-1 0.1076 0.0948 0.1072 0.1364 0.1068 0.1421
SUE 0.1412 <.0001 0.1395 0.0001 0.1392 0.0002
MTB -0.0052 0.0006 -0.0049 0.0006 -0.0048 0.0010
Ln_Assets t-1 -0.0003 0.7104 -0.0003 0.6692 -0.0001 0.9138
Int_Coverage t-1 -0.0001 0.0034 -0.0001 0.0094
Curr_Ratio t-1 0.0004 0.6970 0.0005 0.6338
EA_AVAR 0.0003 0.0002
EA_AVOL -0.0018 <.0001
Fixed Effects
Clustered SE
Number of Observations
R-squared
Year
Firm
11,440
0.0018
Year
0.0133
Year Year
Firm Firm Firm
10,912 9,528 9,528
0.0117 0.0260
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Table 7 presents results from the OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings announcements 
over the period 1997 to 2006: 
 
EA_CARt = α0 + α1DCV_Reversalt + α2Losst  + α3ROAt  + α4ROAt-1  + α5SUEt-1   
+ α6MTB +  α7Ln_Assetst-1 + α8Int_Coveraget-1 + α9Curr_Ratiot-1 + α10Cov_Ratiot   
α11EA_AVARst-1 +  α12EA_AVOLst-1 + γt                                                                                   (5) 
   
EA_CARt is firm i’s 3-day abnormal cumulative return centered on the earnings announcement date for quarter t.  
DCV_Reversal is an indicator variable that = 1 for firms that had an implied violation or disclosed a violation in the 
previous quarter but that do not have an implied violation in the current period and that will not disclose a violation 
in the yet to be filed financial statements and = 0 otherwise.  ROAt is net income for firm i in quarter t divided by 
assets in quarter t-1. ROAt-1  is the return on assets for quarter t-1.   Losst  is in indicator variable = 1 if the firm 
experienced a loss in quarter t.  Int_Coveraget-1 is the interest coverage ratio for firm i in quarter t-1 and is truncated 
at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  SUE is earnings for quarter t less earnings for quarter t-1 scaled by the market value 
of equity in quarter t-1 for firm i and is truncated at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Ln_MVEt-1  is the natural log of the 
market value of equity for quarter t-1.  MTB is the natural log of the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity in quarter t-1.  Curr_Ratiot-1is current assets divided by current liabilities for quarter t-1.  Cov_Ratio 
is the maximum allowable value of debt-to-EBITDA for firm i in quarter t before a technical violation occurs. 
EA_AVAR is the 3-day abnormal variance centered around the earnings announcement date for firm i in quarter t.  
EA_AVOL is the 3-day abnormal trading volume centered around the earnings announcement date for firm i in 
quarter t.  The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm.  Year fixed effects are included. 
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Table 8:  Market Response to Violation Disclosure in the Financial 
Statements for With an Earnings-Based Covenant Firms 
Dependent Variable: SEC_CARt
VARIABLES
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Intercept -0.0061 0.2357 -0.0216 0.0776
VIOL t 0.0011 0.8539 0.0029 0.7086
Loss t -0.0031 0.2279 -0.0023 0.6330
ROA t 0.0409 0.1973 0.1784 0.4075
ROAt-1 0.0422 0.1285 0.0585 0.4312
SUE 0.0052 0.2726 0.0347 0.0999
MTB -0.0037 0.0011 0.0010 0.6193
Ln_Assets t 0.0010 0.0677 0.0021 0.0873
Curr_Ratio t -0.0006 0.2810 -0.0002 0.9269
SEC_AVAR 0.0004 0.1548 0.0000 0.9618
SEC_AVOL 0.0001 0.8942 -0.0002 0.7733
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Clustered SE Firm Firm
Number of Observations 11,440 1,946
R-squared 0.0117 0.0149
Model (1) Firms With Earnings-
based Covenant
Model (2) Firms With 
Implied Violation
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Table 8 presents results from the OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings announcements 
over the period 1997 to 2006: 
 
SEC_CARt = α0 + α1VIOLt + α2Losst  + α3ROAt  + α4ROAt-1  + α5SUEt   
+ α6MTB  +  α7Ln_Assetst-1 + α8Curr_Ratiot-1 + α9Cov_Ratiot   
+ α10SEC_AVARst-1 +  α11SEC_AVOLst-1 + γt                                                                                   (6) 
   
SEC_CARt is firm i’s 3-day abnormal cumulative return centered on the financial statement filing date for quarter t.  
VIOL is an indicator variable that = 1 if a firm i disclosed a debt covenant violation in its financial statements for 
quarter t and = 0 otherwise.  ROAt is net income for firm i in quarter t divided by assets in quarter t-1. ROAt-1  is the 
return on assets for quarter t-1.   Losst  is in indicator variable = 1 if the firm experienced a loss in quarter t.  SUE is 
earnings for quarter t less earnings for quarter t-1 scaled by the market value of equity in quarter t-1 for firm i.  
Ln_MVEt-1  is the natural log of the market value of equity for quarter t-1.  MTB is the natural log of the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity in quarter t-1.  Curr_Ratiot-1is current assets divided by current 
liabilities for quarter t-1.  Cov_Ratio is the maximum allowable value of debt-to-EBITDA for firm i in quarter t 
before a technical violation occurs. SEC_AVAR is the 3-day abnormal variance centered around the financial 
statement filing date for firm i in quarter t.  SEC_AVOL is the 3-day abnormal trading volume centered around the 
financial statement filing date for firm i in quarter t.  The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by firm.  Year fixed effects are included. 
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Table 9:  Market Response to Violation Disclosure in the Financial Statements
Dependent Variable: SEC_CARt
VARIABLES
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Intercept 0.0341 0.5762 0.0342 0.5753
VIOL t -0.0043 0.0040 -0.0044 0.0039
Loss t -0.0071 <.0001 -0.0072 <.0001
ROA t 0.0257 <.0001 0.0256 <.0001
ROAt-1 -0.0060 0.0882 -0.0060 0.0876
SUE -0.0001 0.8145 -0.0001 0.8013
MTB -0.0016 <.0001 -0.0016 <.0001
Ln_Assets t 0.0006 <.0001 0.0006 <.0001
Curr_Ratio t 0.0000 0.9344 0.0000 0.9261
SEC_AVAR 0.0013 <.0001 0.0013 <.0001
SEC_AVOL -0.0005 0.3850 -0.0005 0.3882
Fixed Effects
Clustered SE
Number of Observations
R-squared
Model (1) Full Violation 
Sample
Model (2) Firms Without 
EB Covenant
Yes Yes
Firm Firm
168,486 157,178
0.1078 0.1112  
 
 
Table 9 presents results from the OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings announcements 
over the period 1997 to 2006: 
 
SEC_CARt = α0 + α1VIOLt + α2Losst  + α3ROAt  + α4ROAt-1  + α5SUEt-1   
+ α6MTB  +  α7Ln_Assetst-1 + α8Curr_Ratiot-1 + α9Cov_Ratiot   
+ α10SEC_AVARst-1 +  α11SEC_AVOLst-1 + γt                                                                                   (6) 
   
SEC_CARt is firm i’s 3-day abnormal cumulative return centered on the financial statement filing date for quarter t.  
VIOL is an indicator variable that = 1 if a firm i disclosed a debt covenant violation in its financial statements for 
quarter t and = 0 otherwise.  ROAt is net income for firm i in quarter t divided by assets in quarter t-1. ROAt-1  is the 
return on assets for quarter t-1.   Losst  is in indicator variable = 1 if the firm experienced a loss in quarter t.  SUE is 
earnings for quarter t less earnings for quarter t-1 scaled by the market value of equity in quarter t-1 for firm i.  
Ln_MVEt-1  is the natural log of the market value of equity for quarter t-1.  MTB is the natural log of the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity in quarter t-1.  Curr_Ratiot-1is current assets divided by current 
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liabilities for quarter t-1.  Cov_Ratio is the maximum allowable value of debt-to-EBITDA for firm i in quarter t 
before a technical violation occurs. SEC_AVAR is the 3-day abnormal variance centered around the financial 
statement filing date for firm i in quarter t.  SEC_AVOL is the 3-day abnormal trading volume centered around the 
financial statement filing date for firm i in quarter t.  The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by firm.  Year fixed effects are included. 
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Table 10:  Market Response to Implied Violation and Violation Disclosure 
For Accounting-based Covenant Firms
VARIABLES
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Intercept -0.0093 0.6709 -0.0051 0.8821
VIOL t -0.0302 0.0698 -0.0143 0.4323
ROA t 0.0230 0.2342 0.0365 0.1374
ROA t-1 0.1446 0.0074 -0.0386 0.4675
SUE 0.0285 0.4322 0.0278 0.4521
Cov_Ratio 0.0102 0.2626 0.0118 0.2546
Curr_Ratio t -0.0005 0.7038 -0.0022 0.0781
Capex t 0.0000 0.1797 0.0000 0.7449
Leverage t 0.0013 0.1677 -0.0001 0.8930
MTB -0.0095 0.0625 -0.0056 0.4249
Ln_Assets t -0.0021 0.4738 0.0001 0.9690
Fixed Effects
Clustered SE
Number of Observations
R-squared
Firm Firm
801 801
0.0476 0.0230
Model (1) Dep Var = 
SEC_CAR t
Model (2) Dep Var = 
EA_CAR t
Year Year
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Table 10 presents results from the OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings 
announcements over the period 1997 to 2006: 
 
CARt = α0 + α1VIOLt + α2Losst  + α3ROAt  + α4ROAt-1  + α5SUEt-1   
+ α6MTB  +  α7Ln_Assetst-1 + α8Curr_Ratiot-1 + α9Cov_Ratiot   
+ α10SEC_AVARst-1 +  α11SEC_AVOLst-1 + γt                                                                                   (7) 
   
CARt is firm i’s 3-day abnormal cumulative return centered on the financial statement filing or earnings 
announcement date for quarter t.  VIOL is an indicator variable that = 1 if a firm i disclosed a debt covenant violation 
in its financial statements for quarter t and = 0 otherwise.  Implied_Curr_Ratio_Violt is an indicator variable that =1 
if the current ratio computed on the SEC filing date suggests a debt covenant violion.  ROAt is net income for firm i 
in quarter t divided by assets in quarter t-1. ROAt-1  is the return on assets for quarter t-1.   Losst  is in indicator 
variable = 1 if the firm experienced a loss in quarter t.  SUE is earnings for quarter t less earnings for quarter t-1 
scaled by the market value of equity in quarter t-1 for firm i.  Ln_Assetst-1  is the natural log of firm assets for quarter 
t-1.  Capex is the capital expenditure for firm i in quarter t.  Leverage is the debt-to-equity ratio for firm i in quarter 
t.  MTB is the natural log of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in quarter t-1.  
Curr_Ratiot-1is current assets divided by current liabilities for quarter t-1.  Cov_Ratio is the maximum allowable 
current ratio for firm i in quarter t before a technical violation occurs.  The standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm.  Year fixed effects are included. 
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